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Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace

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This article is interested in the interface between internationally supported peace operations and local approaches to peace that may draw on traditional, indigenous and customary practice. It argues that peace (and security, development and reconstruction) in societies emerging from violent conflict tends to be a hybrid between the external and the local. The article conceptualizes how this hybrid or composite peace is constructed and maintained. It proposes a four-part conceptual model to help visualize the interplay that leads to hybridized forms of peace. Hybrid peace is the result of the interplay of the following: the compliance powers of liberal peace agents, networks and structures; the incentivizing powers of liberal peace agents, networks and structures; the ability of local actors to resist, ignore or adapt liberal peace interventions; and the ability of local actors, networks and structures to present and maintain alternative forms of peacemaking.

Keywords liberal peace • liberal interventionism • hybridity • traditional peacemaking • conflict

THIS ARTICLE IS AN EXERCISE IN CONCEPTUAL SCOPING. It seeks to outline a conceptual language and landscape that can describe the processes whereby peace is constructed in societies emerging from civil war. In particular, the article is interested in contexts that have experienced 'liberal peace' interventions. The liberal peace is defined as the dominant form of peacemaking and peacebuilding favoured by leading states, international organizations and international financial institutions. This is responsible for the kinds of internationally sponsored 'peace' seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and other contexts that have experienced international peace support interventions. The article stems from dissatisfaction with some critiques of the liberal peace that tend towards caricatures of an all-powerful liberal internationalism. Rather than monolithic and hegemonic peacemaking and peacebuilding processes from the international community, it is more accurate to envisage peace and

development processes that are a composite of exogenous and indigenous forces. The statement that contemporary peace and development is the result of a complex mix of local and international forces is hardly a revelation. This article, however, seeks to be innovative by conceptualizing the processes of mixing and distorting through the lens of hybridity.

The article is largely conceptual and seeks to outline a schema that illustrates the interaction between the various international and local actors that combine to produce the hybrid peace. While the article draws on empirical observations, it does not draw directly on fieldwork. Nor does the article seek to advocate a particular form of peacemaking, peacebuilding, reconstruction or development. Instead, it seeks to describe a real-world condition and the process whereby that condition is constructed, maintained and replicated. It is particularly interested in the interplay between the various factors that come together to produce a hybrid peace. In effect, local and international actors (not discrete categories) are rarely able to act autonomously. Instead, all actors are compelled to operate in an environment shaped in some way by others. While international interveners (principal liberal peace agents) may devise comprehensive peacebuilding or development strategies, these will become distorted as they contend with the strategies and reactions of local actors. The hybrid peace is a result of a series of distortions and reminds us of the lack of autonomy on the part of actors in peacemaking contexts.

In terms of structure, the article begins with an outline of the liberal peace and its critiques. It then discusses the notion of hybridity. While the concept has gained much prominence in anthropological and post-colonial studies, it has been underutilized in relation to the study of contemporary security, peace and conflict. The article proposes a four-part conceptual model to help visualize the interplay that leads to the development of hybridized forms of peace. It is argued that hybrid peace results from the interplay of the following: the compliance powers of liberal peace agents, networks and structures; the incentivizing powers of liberal peace agents, networks and structures; the ability of local actors to resist, ignore or adapt liberal peace interventions; and the ability of local actors, networks and structures to present and maintain alternative forms of peacemaking. The concluding discussion considers how these regimes interact to produce a composite or hybrid peace.

The Liberal Peace

Given the dominance of Western states, institutions and technologies in contemporary peacemaking, peace accord implementation and development, it is legitimate to use the liberal peace as the principal reference frame for an account of how international and local forms of peacemaking combine to

produce a hybridized peace. The term has been popularized in a number of, largely critical, accounts of contemporary peacemaking, peacebuilding, post-war reconstruction and development literature (Chandler, 2004; Fanthorpe, 2006; Richmond & Franks, 2007; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2007; Petersen, 2009). The liberal peace is taken to mean the dominant form of internationally supported peacemaking and peacebuilding that is promoted by leading states, leading international organizations and international financial institutions. These peace interventions and peacebuilding strategies are justified using liberal rhetoric. The concept of the liberal peace is a broad umbrella, as it takes account of the ideology of peacemaking, the socio-cultural norms of peacemaking, the structural factors that enable and constrain it, its principal actors and clients, and its manifestations. The term seeks to capture the totality of internationally sponsored peace support interventions, and so the way in which the term is used in this context is very different from its usage in some econometric studies that interrogate datasets in the hope of finding correlations between trade statistics and the propensity of states going to war. Crucially for this work, the liberal peace offers a comparative lens enabling the examination of multiple peacemaking interventions in the contemporary era.

According to its critics, it reflects the practical and ideological interests of the global north. It draws on the Wilsonian tradition and deploys liberal rhetoric to justify peacemaking interventions. In its proponents' view, liberalism is the 'ideology upon which life, culture, society, prosperity and politics are assumed to rest' (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2007: 493). While 'there is no canonical description of liberalism' (Doyle, 1983: 206), it is possible to identify core liberal values that are found with regularity in justifications of peace interventions. Thus there has been the repeated invocation of, and peacebuilding strategies to reflect, the primacy of the individual, the belief in the reformability of individuals and institutions, pluralism and toleration, the rule of law, and the protection of property. Eric Herring (2008: 48) gives a good summary of liberalism as operationalized in the contemporary world: 'a formal and informal commitment to principles and practices of individual rights and responsibility in the context of equality of opportunity, the rule of law, freedom of expression and association, a mainly market economy and governments chosen in multi-party free elections'.

Liberalism is capable of constructing a beguiling and attractive rationale for its own promotion. Thus it speaks of 'responsibility', 'development', 'common interests' and, above all, intervention (Williams, 2007: 543). Sometimes called 'liberal interventionism' or 'liberal internationalism', the liberal peace is most visible in societies undergoing Western-backed peace support interventions in the aftermath of civil war. But many of the tools of the liberal peace, particularly in disciplining societies, governments and economies, are also at work in developing states that have not experienced war in the recent

past. In non-postwar environments, these interventions are often covered by the terms 'good governance', 'poverty reduction strategy papers' and 'reform' (Abrahamsen, 2004; Craig & Porter, 2003). The rationale for intervention based on liberalism stems from the belief – shared by many governments in the global north and international organizations – that liberalism is intrinsically peace-promoting. Through the 'democratic peace' thesis (or the 'liberal peace' thesis), advocates of liberal interventionism have posited links between the type of economic and political organization within a state and liberal outcomes (Doyle, 1995: 84). This strain of thought attests that since liberal states do not go to war with each other, then the 'solution' to international aggression is to export liberal forms of state-building.

Liberalism has provided the intellectual underpinning for a series of post-Cold War international interventions (Cooper, 2002). Indeed, Williams (2006: 2) has identified the development of a 'new liberal militancy' in the wake of 9/11. Thus, liberalism has encouraged states and international organizations to express concern with the condition of citizens within. Allied with the liberal belief in the reformability of individuals and institutions is an equally confident belief in the superiority of liberal ideas (and a consequent denigration of 'non-liberal' ideas). As Williams (2006: 5) observed, liberals believe 'quite sincerely in the creation of a better world and that they are the exemplars of what that world should look like'. All of this combines to create a predisposition towards intervention and particular types of liberal prescriptions. In short, in the post-Cold War period, a number of states and international actors have displayed an exuberant confidence in the abilities of their anointed version of liberalism to save the world. Liberal remedies offered salvation against war, poverty, disease and 'terrorism'. Liberalism had become a kind of magic dust that, if spread within states and economies, would produce harmony and prosperity at the international level.

Critics of the liberal peace point to its central irony: that it often uses illiberal means in its promotion of liberal values (Williams, 2005). They contend that it is an essentially conservative and realist philosophy that reinforces the position of power-holders (national, regional, international elites and their private-sector allies), while doing little to emancipate the general population (Jacoby, 2007: 536–537; Mayall, 2006: 96). In this view, the liberal peace is equated with negative peace, or forms of peace that address conflict manifestations but avoid structural change. The liberal peace is criticized for its alleged ethnocentrism – its promotion of essentially Western values and its belief in the universalism of liberal goals. Critics also point to the unbending belief in the liberating abilities of the free market shown by the international financial institutions and leading states in their postwar reconstruction strategies. In a sense, the liberal peace becomes a neoliberal peace and engages in 'aggressive social engineering', whereby the private sector is privileged over notions of the common good, often with profound human consequences

(Pugh, 2006a: 153). As Pugh (2006b: 271) observes, 'peace operations can be considered an integral part of the world ordering project that has accompanied projects for stabilising capitalism'. According to the critique, liberal interventionism uses state-building as its principal vehicle of reform, promoting Western-style governance and electoral processes (Sriram, 2008: 35–37). Advocates of the liberal peace are accused of attempting to replicate Western democratic, economic and social processes to the extent that observers pithily referred to the enterprise as 'getting to Denmark', a byword for a generic 'any state' with a functioning bureaucracy, developed economy and compliant foreign policy (Pritchett & Woolcock, 2004: 191–212). Darby & Mac Ginty (2008: 4–6) highlight the deeply compromised, poor-quality peace that often results from liberal peace interventions characterized by technocratic 'solutions' that fail to deal with the affective dimensions of grievances that can linger across generations.

Proponents of liberal peace interventions (who – like the critics – by no means comprise a homogenous bloc) suggest that the core elements of the liberal peace (security and stabilization, reinforcing states, democratic governance, and marketization) bring the ability to emancipate people. They do not see liberal interventionism as part of a large-power aggrandizement project. Instead, they note that only international processes organized by capable states or international organizations are able to mobilize the resources necessary for the large-scale state rebuilding (Cooper, 2003). Often this involves difficult choices. As Quinn & Cox (2007: 517) note:

While a liberal peace of a more home-grown, or even 'emancipatory' kind might well be desirable in the abstract, in most situations where the issue arises, the international community and the United States find themselves facing a choice between imposing peace from the outside, with some aspiration to grafting liberal institutions on to such an imposed order at a later stage, or simply allowing the forces already pushing a society into violence to run their bloody course.

Post-civil war contexts may necessitate difficult trade-offs, particularly concerning the 'order versus liberty' dilemma. Proponents of the liberal peace would argue that security is a necessary prerequisite for liberty (as articulated by the 'institutionalization before liberalization' formulation associated with Roland Paris [2004]). They also question the degree to which critics have feasible alternatives.

The extent to which liberal ideas have influenced contemporary peace and reconstruction interventions is not in doubt. This is an era dominated by the liberal peace. Yet, there is a risk of overestimating the power and coherence of the liberal peace. As will be discussed in later sections, local actors can have considerable agency, which results in a hybridized peace. It is also important to underscore the power of regional and international powers (such as China and Russia) to provide alternative sources of coercion, incentives and tutelage.

In summary, the liberal peace is the dominant mode of peacemaking, peace-

building, reconstruction and development favoured by powerful actors from the global north. Underpinned by specific interpretations of liberal ideas, the liberal peace is the 'software' that drives the 'hardware' of many international organizations, states and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs). It has helped shape the international norms (for example, international human rights laws or the Millennium Development Goals) that dominate the landscape of international peace and development. Leading states from the global north, and the international institutions that they control, constitute the principal agents of the liberal peace. These are joined by a series of other agents, such as national governments, municipalities and INGOs, who often operate in the society emerging from conflict. The liberal peace can thus be conceived as a top-down transmission chain of peace-making ideas, language and practice. The principal agents are able to coerce and incentivize some degree of compliance. As will become clear in later sections, the principal liberal peace agents are unable to construct neat silos of compliance. Liberal peace agents and structures are fallible, prone to distraction, and suffer from limitations in budgets and capabilities. Richmond's (2005a: 217) 'graduations of the liberal peace model' is useful in helping to illustrate the variety of liberal peaces on offer: hyper-conservatism, conservative, orthodox and emancipatory.

Despite its limitations, the liberal peace is pervasive, shaping international structures and the language of peacemaking, and amassing immense material power in service of its preferred notions of peace and development. Given the pervasive nature of liberal peacemaking and the internationalized nature of civil war, it is difficult to conceive of actors completely outside of the liberal peace ambit. To some extent, virtually all actors involved in peacemaking and peacebuilding have to take cognizance of structures, principles and laws shaped by the liberal peace. Finally, it is important not to make an exclusive equation between liberalism (and linked notions of pluralism and toleration) and the global north. Instead, it is worth bearing in mind the rich traditions of pluralism and toleration found in the global south.

Conceptualizing Hybridity

In many ways, the concept of hybridity defies neat categorization. Much of the literature on hybridity descends into discussions of relativity from which it is difficult to gain bearings. To caricature some of this literature: everything is the result of hybridity, everything is a hybrid, there can be no certainty, and all discussions must be smothered in caveats (McEwan, 2008: 77). This article seeks to move beyond such discussions to examine hybridization, or hybridity as a process. Specifically, it is interested in the processes whereby hybrid

peace comes about. It seeks to conceptualize the 'variable geometry' of peace whereby different actors coalesce and conflict to different extents on different issues to produce a fusion peace. In the context of a peace-implementation environment, for example, we might see how local mores hold sway on issues of reconciliation, while international norms and practices prevail in relation to the structure of the economy. The result is a hybridized peace that is in constant flux, as different actors and processes cooperate and compete on different issue agendas.

The concept of hybridity has been dissected and used in anthropology, sociology, institutional and organizational studies, and post-colonial studies, but has been sparingly deployed in studies of peace and conflict.¹ Only recently has the term been applied to contemporary peace implementation and postwar environments, with Boege et al. (2009) investigating 'hybrid political orders' and Richmond (2009a) writing on the 'liberal-local hybrid'. The concept has been important in underlining the importance of culture in discourses on power and identity (Canclini, 2005: xxiii). On first glance, the concept of the hybrid may direct attention to a process whereby a pure entity is diluted. Robert Young (1995: 10) notes how fears of 'the grafting of diversity into singularity' often reflect anxieties over race and culture. He notes Victorian angst at 'mongrelity' and the 'degeneration of races'. This notion of hybridity as a process whereby entities are threatened with adulteration or weakness has largely been overtaken by views of hybridity as part of constant lending and borrowing between cultures and societies. Rosaldo (2005: xv) sees hybridity 'as the ongoing condition of all human cultures, which contain no zones of purity because they undergo continuous processes of transculturation'. This definition underscores the fluidity of human societies, even societies that may be labelled as 'traditional' or 'indigenous'. It also applies to societies that might seem insular or isolated from the cosmopolitan cross-currents provoked by globalized flows of people, ideas and resources. The advice to avoid thinking of pristine social or cultural 'zones of purity' is a useful corrective to narratives favoured by nationalists or ethnic entrepreneurs that stress the singular identity of groups.

Notions of hybridity move us away from the binary combinations that can seem attractive in helping to explain the social and political world: modern versus traditional, Western versus non-Western, legal-rational versus ritualistic-irrational. Such binary combinations may simplify comprehension, but they risk projecting oversimplified notions of human societies that are divided into discrete compartmentalized units. These lopsided binaries also risk reinforcing hegemonized meanings, thus setting in stone the privileged positions of Western perspectives (Eckl & Weber, 2006: 6). As Meredith (1998: 1) observed, it is more accurate to conceptualize culture and identity in terms

¹ The term 'hybrid regime' has been often used in the classification of democracies, and the term 'hybrid peace force' has been used to describe the United Nations–African Union forces in Darfur.

of 'both/and' rather than the 'us/them' of bi-cultural analyses. Indeed, it is useful to think of entities (individuals, communities, institutions) as being hybridized from the outset. In this view, social and political processes – such as peacemaking, peacebuilding or postwar reconstruction – involve the interaction of a series of already hybridized actors and structures. Although these actors and structures may be labelled as 'local', 'indigenous', 'liberal', 'exogenous' or 'international', it is useful to see them as composites, or amalgamations resulting from long-term processes of social negotiation and adaptation. This is easy to imagine in the case of multilateral coalitions in peace support operations (Shaw, MacLean & Black, 2006). In such cases, the problems and opportunities of hybridity are well known – for example, issues surrounding coordination between different national units in a multilateral peace support operation. It is less easy to imagine the composite nature of actors in local contexts in which communities might be geographically isolated, display peculiar cultural traits, and appear to be indigenous. But Canclini (2005: xxv) reminds us of prior hybridization by noting 'socio-cultural processes in which discrete structures or practices, previously existing in separate form, are combined to generate new structures, objects and practices. In turn, it bears noting that the so-called discrete structures were a result of prior hybridization and therefore cannot be considered pure points of origin.' It would seem that humankind is already tainted by the 'original sin' of hybridization.

In order to conceptualize how processes of hybridization operate, the article will now discuss four elements that interact to create hybridized versions of peace: the compliance powers of the liberal peace; the incentive powers of the liberal peace; the ability of local actors to resist, ignore or subvert the liberal peace; and the ability of local actors to formulate and maintain alternatives to the liberal peace. All of these variables are interdependent and occupy a space partially constructed by the other variables. The purpose of the article is to provide a conceptual model that may inform later empirical research on contemporary liberal peace contexts. It is the contention here that the liberal peace is hybridized.

The Compliance Powers of the Liberal Peace

Promoters of the liberal peace are able to mobilize a formidable suite of compliance mechanisms to encourage conformity and to discipline attempts at deviance. The obvious compliance tool is force or the threat of force, such as attempts to 'install democracy at gunpoint' in Afghanistan (MacGregor, 2009). But other compliance mechanisms abound, most notably the globalized free market that simultaneously offers both opportunities and constraints. In order to access reconstruction resources (often loans and assistance from

international financial institutions), states emerging from civil war must conform to the strictures of the international financial system (Brynen, 2000). Thus the economy must be marketized, the public sector pared, new governance regimes instituted, and any semblance of state financial sovereignty sacrificed to the demands of international and transnational economic flows. In many cases, the liberal peace has become a series of binding relationships predicated on Western economic and governance norms. Although many of its key transmission agents may be local actors (government ministries and national elites, municipalities, NGOs, etc), the DNA is Western and may have profound implications for the host society and culture. The rhetoric of 'participation', 'local ownership' and 'partnership' may do little to mask power relations in which the conception, design, funding, timetable, execution and evaluation of programmes and projects are conducted according to Western agendas (Cooke & Kothari, 2002). The cooption of local actors as agents of the liberal peace (for example, the national government or municipalities) means that a hierarchy of compliance is constructed and maintained. In many cases, the management of compliance is devolved from the international to the national to the local.

Perhaps the most insidious compliance tool operating in favour of the liberal peace is the notion that the liberal peace is the 'only deal in town'. The genius of many commercial monopolies is in persuading the consumer that there is really only one choice. The liberal peace, because of the strength of its chief proponents and the resources they can mobilize, has had considerable success in promoting the notion that there is one acceptable version of peace and that other versions do not constitute 'peace'. In other words, the proponents of the liberal peace have been able to mobilize massive psychological resources to set the boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable peace. The 'moral authority' of the liberal peace stems from the power of its promoters, the intellectual heritage they deploy in justifying their peace support interventions, and the co-option of major international organizations and international NGOs in the service of this version of peace. The power of precedence also comes into play: the liberal peace has been road-tested in many locations and many aspects of it have been seen to work, particularly in relation to the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance.

The compliance regimes of the liberal peace show enormous variance. Some locations have experienced liberal coercion and the assiduous promotion and enforcement of the liberal peace. This might be manifested through heavily militarized security and stabilization programmes (Iraq and Afghanistan), comprehensive state-building programmes (Sierra Leone and Liberia), intrusive democratic-governance programmes (Timor Leste), and rigid marketization (Bosnia and Herzegovina). Other locations, however, might experience 'liberal peace-lite' or a more relaxed form of liberal interventionism. Richmond's (2005b: 10–11) continuum of the liberal peace in practice illus-

trates considerable variance in the application of the liberal peace. Moreover, the range of factors that may influence the extent of the liberal peace to be visited upon a host state is potentially limitless. On the 'supply side' (that is, the willingness of advanced Western states and capable international organizations to promote liberal internationalism in a specific location), principal agents of the liberal peace may be influenced by their strategic interests, domestic political cycle, changes in leadership, budgetary constraints, or distraction by other foreign policy issues. There is a danger that analysts might ascribe excessive retrospective coherence to a form of peacemaking that relies on ad hoc decisionmaking and an unthinking bureaucracy.

The Incentivizing Powers of the Liberal Peace

The variable geometry of the liberal peace means that it is able to combine coercive elements with gentler, persuasive incentives. Certainly the supportive rhetoric of the liberal peace is replete with potential for the individual, the community and the state. While the core elements of the liberal peace (security and stabilization, reinforcing statehood, democratic governance, and the extension of the free market) can have negative consequences, they also hold out positive potential. Security and stabilization can be restrained, targeted and cognizant of the need to protect human rights and minorities. In the context of post-civil war and deeply divided societies, security (and particularly demobilization) is often a necessary prerequisite not only for a peace accord but also for the range of state-building, peacebuilding and reconstruction tasks that often facilitate the implementation of a peace accord (Stedman, 2002: 668). Through a positive lens, reinforcing statehood can enable widespread social improvement: protecting and promoting human rights, ensuring the widespread provision of public goods, and establishing a bureaucracy capable of managing democratic transitions. Democratic governance can help promote responsibility and the civic virtues that may prevent conflict recidivism. It is, in US President George W. Bush's (2008) phrase, 'the beauty of democracy'. Potentially, the free market can be liberating and emancipating: rewarding creativity and offering independence and the opportunity for self-improvement. Deudney & Ikenberry (1999: 190) observe the political ambitions of the promotion of open economies: 'liberal states have pursued economic openness for political ends, using free trade as an instrument to alter and maintain the preferences and features of other states that are politically and strategically congenial'. In this sense, free markets are politically pacifying, in that they bind states and citizens (remodelled as consumers, producers, regulators and enablers) into a series of mutual ties.

As already noted, the liberal peace is a 'big tent', able to accommodate both coercive-realist and emancipatory elements. As the case of contemporary Afghanistan reveals, liberal internationalism can combine both a military iron fist and extensive developmental and reconstruction programmes. Canadian troops fired over 4.7 million bullets in Afghanistan in a 20-month period (Canada.com, 2008). At the same time, Afghanistan was Canada's largest recipient of international assistance, with commitments to 'democracy-building and governance, economic and rural development, infra-structure, education, health, landmine clearance, counter-narcotics activities, military and police training, security, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration' (Library of Parliament, 2007). The US Counterinsurgency Manual (Department of the Army, 2006: 2) tasked its troops with combining war-fighting with peacebuilding: 'Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors.' The sheer scale of intervention in Afghanistan means that enormous resources are brought to a resource-hungry context, creating a complex and extensive incentive structure that encourages Afghans to cooperate with the intervention forces. This applies at the national, municipal and local levels, and in the private and public sectors, thus creating a network of Afghan liberal peace agents. Cooperation with the liberal peace becomes a route through which to access resources, whether power and legitimacy or livelihood.

Critics of the liberal peace counter that any 'incentives' and rewards are illusory and unevenly shared. They say that there are limits to the liberalism on offer: the liberal peace cannot cope with radical difference in society, it prioritizes rights over needs, is wedded to territorial sovereignty, and is ultimately secularist in its worldview. They are sceptical of the 'certainties of disciplinary liberalism' to deliver social distribution: 'The poor do not benefit from policies of self-reliance and the privatisation of basic needs' (Pugh, 2006b: 285). Importantly, though, many proponents of the liberal peace regard liberal internationalism as a route through which the Millennium Development Goals can be met. For example, security and stabilization, as well as reinforcing state and governance capacities, are regarded as prerequisites for the efficient delivery of public goods and thus poverty reduction, the spread of education, maternal and child health, etc. Promoters of the more emancipatory versions/elements of the liberal peace are careful not to regard liberal peace agents in host societies as mere recipients, supplicants and beneficiaries. Instead, they use a discourse of partnership and cooperation in which relationships are mutual and incentives are not conceived of as unequal economic transactions.

The Ability of Local Actors To Resist, Ignore or Adapt Liberal Peace Interventions

The third factor that influences the extent to which peace might be hybridized concerns the ability of actors, networks and structures in host states to resist, ignore, subvert or adapt liberal peace interventions. This factor is important in that it reminds us of the agency of actors in host societies. Rather than being mere passive actors (victims, recipients, beneficiaries, etc.), local actors may be capable of considerable autonomous action. By pushing back against 'the echoes of colonialism', local actors may have power to hybridize peace (Richmond, 2009b). Of course, this power to resist will vary according to context, and in some contexts exogenous actors, networks and structures will dominate, leaving minimal room for local agency. In other contexts, liberal internationalism may be promoted in a half-hearted way or in a more relaxed format, allowing local actors more freedom to exert their influence. Crucial here will be the extent to which traditional or indigenous structures and norms (themselves hybrids) are intact (Mac Ginty, 2008). Often they may have been severely eroded by conflict. Respect for village elders in a rural African context, for example, may have been reduced by the dislocation of conflict, rural-urban migration and the dissipation of moral authority caused by long-term social change. But, in other cases, norms and practices based on kinship or an understanding of the local ecology may survive and hold local legitimacy.

Important factors in the ability of local actors to resist or subvert the liberal peace include the extent to which local actors retain power during a liberal peace transition, the extent to which external actors are dependent on local actors (e.g. a client government), the extent to which national, regional and local institutions are intact in the wake of a violent conflict, and the extent to which local actors (whether at state, regional or local level) can marshal resources (taxes, tradable goods, etc.). A comprehensive state-building operation, as in Afghanistan or Sierra Leone, allows international actors greater leeway to institute new actors, institutions and practices. In cases where local actors retain some sovereignty or there is continuity dating back to previous regimes, then more delicate and protracted 'negotiations' take place.

In some cases, there may be outright resistance to the liberal peace. Just as most liberal peace implementation is subtle (for example, multiple small-scale governance projects), resistance to the liberal peace may also be subtle. It may take the form of non-cooperation, not necessarily in a wilful sense but based on a calculation that life would be easier without the entanglements that exposure to liberal internationalism might bring. For example, individuals or groups in a post-civil war society might calculate that a governance programme may only run for two or three years, and rationalize that they can 'sit out' whatever carrots or sticks may be associated with it. Local actors

might also choose to cooperate with certain aspects of the liberal peace while resisting, subverting or ignoring other aspects. As a result, hybrid peace is in a constant state of flux and reflects a multilevel and multi-issue exercise of cooperation and contestation. International actors may not always be well placed to recognize local signs of resistance or subversion. The information-gathering antennae of Western military, political and humanitarian organizations are often very well developed, with institutionalized reporting mechanisms (Copeland, 2009: xiii). But, often these organizations are lacking in the anthropological skills needed to recognize and decipher local behavioural patterns that might be subtle and passive. Costas Constantinou (2007: 250) notes how the secularized worldview of Western observers has identified 'proper categories for political action and emancipation' that conform to a modernity-influenced way of seeing the external world. By extension, many of the modes of understanding and expression adopted by actors from the global south may be viewed as illegitimate, hostile or ungrateful.

The Ability of Local Actors, Structures and Networks To Present and Maintain Alternative Forms of Peace and Peacemaking

The final factor in the construction of hybrid peace concerns the ability of local actors to promote alternative forms of peace. As already mentioned, the hegemonic ambitions of the liberal peace mean that it attempts, often successfully, to minimize the space for alternative versions of peace, development, security and governance. It often succeeds in promoting the perception that it is 'the only game in town' and that locally inspired alternatives that do not ape approved models from the global north are somehow illiberal or illegitimate. Quite simply, in many cases the liberal peace *has* unrivalled coercive and economic power and so is able to overshadow, outbid or outgun alternatives.

Local forms of dispute resolution and reconciliation that draw on traditional, indigenous or customary norms and practices exist in many societies (Mac Ginty, 2008: 139–163). Often these are most apparent at the local level, or on the margins (perhaps in geographically isolated areas of a large state where the reach of liberal peace agents is weak, or among constituencies deemed marginal). Yet, customary practice can also operate at the national elite level, for example in the formation of a coalition government in which power is shared on the basis of kinship and clan as well as some sort of democratic formula. These may not conform to perceptions of legitimate peacemaking or peacebuilding according to the liberal peace perspective, but they may have cultural purchase in the host society.

There is considerable evidence of liberal peace agents encouraging 'traditional' and 'indigenous' dispute resolution as part of wider liberal peace interventions. An example might be the *Nahe Biti* customary mediation process found in Timor Leste. This local-level dispute-resolution process involves a village elder acting as a mediator between disputants, with the disputants publicly putting their case in front of the local community. The *Nahe Biti* methodology was adopted by Timor Leste's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in part to ease the burden on the overloaded courts system (Gusmão, 2003: 2; Byrne, 2005: 2). Evaluations found that the community reconciliation process was able to smooth the re-entry of deponents back into the community, and the mechanisms of 'confession, contrition and compensation' conformed to public expectations of conflict management (Schenk, 2005: 6–7). But, while being culturally intuitive, it was also supported (indeed, to some degree resuscitated) by the international community. The case raises a fundamental question: to what extent is an internationally supported 'indigenous' reconciliation process really 'indigenous' (Mac Ginty, 2008)? Rather than indigenous or imported, the reconciliation process was – like virtually all peacemaking and peacebuilding schemes – a hybrid that drew on multiple sources of practice.

Discussion

Having reviewed the coalition of factors that contribute to a hybrid peace, one might despair at attempting to capture so many constantly moving parts: multiple actors interacting on multiple issues, with no guarantee of consistency on the part of actors, actions and reactions. Yet, despite the constant flux, the four-part conceptualization does allow us to visualize the main factors contributing to a hybrid peace, and conceive of how interplay may develop between them. Rather than a static model, the hybrid peace can be conceived as one of constant dynamism, with all four factors interacting to constrain and distort the activities of the others. The result is a whirr of hybridity. Different factors prevail in different contexts, on different issues, at different times. It is not the case that there is a discrete liberal peace that is then hybridized. Instead, the liberal peace is already hybridized, by dint of the complex multidimensional environment in which it exists. The conceptualization in this model is an attempt to capture and explain the process through which hybridization is perpetuated.

It is tempting to reflect back on eras when the divisions between external and internal notions and practices of peace were more distinct. Historical examples of 'encounter era' contact between different cultures provide insights into processes of accommodation between conflicting versions of

peace and peacemaking. Cases of early (particularly 16th- and 17th-century) European contact with indigenous communities in North America and elsewhere show evidence of willingness on behalf of the newcomers to conform to local methods of peacemaking and dispute resolution. Native American communities and European settlers were the product of prior hybridization, but geography meant that this was a period of first encounters between them. Dispute-resolution methods used in these early years often drew on local tradition and revealed the delicate intercultural negotiation process between different notions of peace promotion. They also point towards the extent to which peace (as an idea and a practice) adopted hybridized forms, assimilating philosophies and methods from various sources and conforming to prevailing power dynamics.

This period saw much conflict, but also cooperation and compromise as indigenous groups and newcomers sought to regulate interaction (Williams, 1994: 987; Burrows & Wallace, 2000: 11–13). At some stage, though, a ‘tipping point’ was reached in which the colonial power secured the capacity to impose its version of peace and provide its own security. Instead of reciprocity, ritual and sustainable resource-sharing came the imposition of Western colonial models of peace and peacemaking, including surrender and re-grant, formal written peace treaties, the violent suppression of indigenous groups and appropriation of their resources. The ‘tipping point’ was rarely a singular cataclysmic moment. Instead, there was more likely to be a series of ‘tipping points’, as the colonial power gained strategic advantage through technology, separate peace deals with tribes, the sheer number of settlers and the degradation of local social, economic and political structures.

The incorporation of warlords and militia commanders in government in post-Taliban Afghanistan provides a good example of the hybridized nature of the liberal peace. A key practical and rhetorical aim of many liberal peace interventions has been to assert a monopoly of violence on behalf of the state and to associate the reformed or rebuilt state with transparency and accountability. In the Afghan case, a perilous security situation and the complex ethnic demography means that such goals cannot be met. The result is a highly hybridized outcome. The internationally sponsored post-Taliban state-building exercise has seen cooperation and cohabitation between a modernist state-building worldview (the liberal peace) and a host of more localized worldviews, some of which award power and legitimacy to semi-feudal warlords. The Afghan case does not allow for clear-cut distinctions between the traditional and the modern, or the Western and non-Western. Instead, it depicts a picture of multiple compromises as local and international actors grapple with the limitations to their power and legitimacy.

The four elements of the model of hybridization are all on display in the Afghan case. The incentivizing powers of the liberal peace include its ability to create and fund a post-Taliban state, while coercive powers of the liberal

peace range from NATO firepower to the ability of the USA to endorse or censure Afghan President Hamid Karzai. The ability of local actors to resist the liberal peace is most evident in the Taliban insurgency, but also evident in everyday actions of non-compliance or the continuation of traditional modes of governance despite the introduction of new technocratic modes. The ability of local actors to provide alternatives to the liberal peace stretches from *loya jirgas*, or traditional consensus-based councils, to the activities of powerful regional warlords to raise their own taxes and armies. The post-Taliban era can be viewed as a system that facilitated and necessitated cooperation, negotiation and conflict between very different actors and has resulted in a composite political environment. Much of this interplay comes down to power (for example, the power to coerce or the material power to provide or withhold incentives). It needs to be conceived of in terms of a variable geometry, or constantly moving parts that operate at multiple levels with regard to multiple issues.

The Afghan example is useful in underscoring that hybridization is not a simple case of discrete Western and non-Western actors and practices coming together to create a fusion polity. The process is much more complex, as actors are neither consistent nor homogenous (indeed, it is worth considering whether President Karzai can be considered a Western or a non-Western figure). Actors can simultaneously engage with the liberal peace in positive and negative ways. For example, a farmer might be politically supportive of the Kabul government but subsidize the Taliban through his economic activity. Similarly, the liberal peace state-building exercise is so fraught with contradictions that it is not even consistent in its own support of liberal goals. On the one hand, there is the stated aim of constructing a functioning state along Weberian lines. On the other, the insurgency has meant that the Western sponsors of the Karzai government have militarily and financially reinforced certain militia commanders as an anti-Taliban bulwark. The case flags up the contradictions within the liberal peace and state-building once operationalized in an insecure environment. In terms of abstract theory, it is possible to make hand-in-glove type arguments on the natural fit of institutionalism with liberalism. The liberal peace, in theory at least, is given life through state-building and a bureaucratized polity that reflects the wishes of its citizens. In Afghanistan, however, the *de facto* power of selected warlords and the resurgence of the Taliban meant that the liberal state-building ideal clashed with the security imperative.

Having discussed the processes whereby the liberal and the indigenous contest, cooperate and coalesce, it is possible to make a number of more general observations about hybridization and peace. First, it is worth underlining the historical antecedence of peace and conflict as social phenomena and as fields of study. The tendency of many analyses of peace and conflict is to concentrate on the contemporary to the exclusion of the long genesis

of movements and ideas. Contemporary studies of 'terrorism', for example, seem remarkably incurious about past insurgencies and independence struggles (Duyvesteyn, 2007: 52). In many cases, peace support interventions and postwar reconstruction programmes have become compartmentalized into time-limited technocratic 'modules' and policy prescriptions. As Tim Jacoby (2007: 522) notes, 'focusing on "how to" rather than "why" has produced anodyne conclusions, typified by uncritical pragmatism and bland admonition'. Hindess (n.d.: 2) observes 'the willingness of western social thought to relegate non-western others to locations in the more or less distant past'. There is also a 'tendency to treat belonging to the past as a bad thing, that is, as a kind of cultural and moral failure' (Hindess, n.d.: 13). In the context of conflict and peacemaking, dispute-resolution techniques that draw on tradition might be viewed as negative. An understanding of the hybridized nature of peace can help counter such perspectives through its emphasis on the long historical pedigrees of conflict and peacemaking.

A second observation is the need to transcend the fatalism that can attend some discussion of hybridity and hybridization, or the notion that everything is relative and nothing can be stated with certainty. While accepting that social processes as well as actors, networks and structures are the result of hybridization, it is also possible to recognize degrees of hybridity. Some actors, networks and structures *are* more fixed than others. This does not mean that they are immutable forever more. Instead, it is a recognition that within the variable geometry of hybridized peace, there are points of resistance and hierarchies of culture (Anthias, 2001: 619–641). Indeed, much of the post-colonialist literature emphasizes the power relationships inherent in intercultural encounters. Edward Said (1994: 230) termed this 'an unequal relationship between unequal interlocutors'. The concept of hybridization, when applied to the liberal peace, encourages us to dissect the various strands and influences that conflict and coalesce to construct the hybridized peace. This dissection aids us in locating the sources and direction of power and agency.

A third observation is to underscore the creativity and pacific engagement that is often involved in constructing and maintaining a hybrid peace. It suggests continuous processes of conflict management in which different interests and values coalesce, cooperate, conflict, re-coalesce and re-cooperate. Much of this process will be unplanned, and requires individuals and collectives to understand (and, if possible, reach an accommodation) with each other's needs. Boege et al. (2009: 11) note how Western perspectives often interpret political hybridity in a negative light. Foreign ministries and INGO headquarters in the global north tend to see being blown off course by local practice and resistance as policy failure. It is worth reassessing this, and noting the creative energies that hybridity often produces, as well as the pacific and enduring results it produces. 'Experience shows . . . that attempts at state-building that ignore or oppose hybridity will encounter considerable

difficulty in generating effective and legitimate outcomes. Strengthening central state institutions is unquestionably important, but if this becomes the main or only focus it threatens to further alienate local societies by rendering them passive, thereby weakening a sense of local responsibility for overcoming problems and local ownership of solutions' (Boege et al., 2009: 11). In this sense, hybridity is worth embracing, as it offers the possibility of sustainability and local acceptance in peace. Policy statements by many states and international institutions assert that peace is a 'strategic' goal. Yet, the evidence of the hybrid nature of the peace that prevails in many societies suggests that pragmatism rather than strategy plays a significant role in pacific outcomes.

A fourth observation is to note the fluidity of peace, security and development and the actors that shape them. Many dominant narratives on individuals, communities and institutions in the midst of conflict underscore intractability and tradition. Yet, notions of hybridism and peace encourage us to note how actors and institutions are capable of change, and become adept at managing change. Most individuals, groups and institutions will, if coerced or incentivized, act instrumentally and often tactically (Constantinou, 2007: 266).

It may be worth concluding by revisiting a concept that has become unfashionable in international relations: power. It is possible to examine hybridized versions of peace and ask: where does the power lie? Clearly, power comes in different forms: moral, cultural, material, etc. In many post-peace accord contexts, the extent to which the power of the liberal peace relies on material power is striking. This is evidenced through its ability to hold territory (the Green Zone in Baghdad), to kill opponents (Predator aircraft strikes on Taliban leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan) or to deliver humanitarian assistance (World Food Programme activities in Sudan). Traditional and local forms of governance and dispute resolution may have more affective purchase, however. They may be able to connect more intuitively with the cultural expectations of communities and thus attain a sustainability and legitimacy that more technocratic interventions cannot. While the liberal peace may be adept at top-down technocratic ministrations through national governments and ministries, local actors may be better placed to deal with aspects of peacebuilding that have emotional dimensions, such as reconciliation or tolerance. It is this interface – between the most effective elements of the liberal peace and local approaches – where the liberal–local hybrid is likely to be most evident. There is very limited evidence from the field that peacebuilders have been able to calibrate peacebuilding interventions so that they play to the strengths of local and external actors. The power (and, it has to be said, clumsiness) of the liberal peace means that its footprint often dominates or at least distorts the peacemaking environment. It is important not to underestimate the power of the liberal peace and regard its only influ-

ence as 'technocratic'. Instead, it is capable of mustering enormous cultural power. A key aspect of this is the extension of the Western 'peace idiom' or the ways in which individuals, groups and institutions conceptualize, articulate, make, codify and maintain peace. While many non-Western societies have rich, tradition-influenced histories of dispute resolution and reconciliation, it is noticeable how the Western peace idiom has become increasingly influential. Terms such as 'conflict resolution' and 'peacebuilding' and practices such as 'facilitation' or 'mediation' are now widespread, suggesting the increasing dominance of Western peacemaking methodologies.

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